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Abstract 
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment 
enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the 
punishment. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party 
vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as 
well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each 
other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of 
punishment requires approval from an independent third party.  
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1. Introduction 
Punishment is a common means to enforce cooperation in a society. Numerous 
laboratory studies have shown that cooperation can sustain even among strangers 
under peer punishment mechanisms where the implicated parties can propose and 
enforce punishment on defectors (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; 
Falk et al., 2005). In many naturally occurring environments, however, an 
independent third party decides whether or how to enforce sanctions proposed by the 
implicated parties. For example, tribe leaders or organization managers often have to 
decide whether to implement sanctions requested by the community or organization 
members. In this paper we take a first step toward understanding how sanctions 
promote cooperation when enforcers are independent of punishment proposers.3  
Previous studies show that individuals are often willing to impose costly 
punishment on defectors in view of the long-term benefit of building a cooperative 
relationship (Gürerk et al., 2006; Gächter et al., 2008). In addition, negative 
emotions trigger costly punishment on wrongdoers even when there is no monetary 
benefit from doing so (Sanfey et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Hopfensitz and 
Reuben, 2009). However, emotions experienced by the punishment receivers, such 
as vengeance or spite, also lead to antisocial punishment (i.e., punishment imposed 
on cooperators either by cooperators or by defectors). 
Based on these previous findings, we construct two hypotheses surrounding the 
decisions of an independent third party who is empowered with the right to uphold 
or negate proposals for punishment. On the one hand, a third party, as an outsider, is 
more likely to veto antisocial punishment (Hypothesis 1) as his judgment is less 
likely to be influenced by vengeance and more likely to be consistent with the 
existing social norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Xiao, 2010; Cubitt et al. 2011). 
Indeed, previous studies on antisocial punishment argue for the importance of 
“shunning retaliation and centralizing punishment in the hands of the state” 
(Herrmann et al., 2008). On the other hand, a third party who is not in the position of 
the victims and who does not benefit from long-term cooperation may reject 
imposing costly punishment on the defectors (Hypothesis 2) for reasons such as 
short-run efficiency. Croson and Konow (2009) also find that impartial spectators 
punish less than implicated stakeholders due to the difference in their moral 
judgment.  
Antisocial punishment has been shown to have a detrimental effect on 
cooperation, but punishment toward defectors can promote cooperation (see, e.g., 
Ertan, et al., 2009; Falk et al., 2005; Herrmann et al. 2008; Masclet et al., 2003; 
Nikiforakis, 2008; Xiao and Kunreuther, 2011). Thus, our hypotheses imply that the 
intervention of a third party is a double-edged sword: It promotes cooperation if 
antisocial punishment is pervasive, but it reduces cooperation when antisocial 
punishment is rare.  
To test our hypotheses, we design an experiment based on a finitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game. In the baseline, players can directly impose costly 
                                                        
3 Previous studies on third party punishment often assume that a third party could directly punish the implicated 
players in the game (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).  
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punishment after observing each other’s actions. In the target treatment, players 
make punishment proposals to an independent third party. Punishment will be 
implemented at the proposer’s cost if the third party approves it. 
We find the cooperation rate is significantly lower in the target treatment than the 
baseline. Supporting our hypotheses, the data show that third parties reject both 
antisocial punishment and punishment towards defectors. Although the third parties’ 
intervention reduces the occurrences of costly punishment, the average earnings are 
still lower in the target treatment than the baseline. 
 
2. Experiment 
Our experiment consists of two treatments: baseline and third-party approval (TPA). 
Subjects are randomly assigned to a group of three. Each subject interacts with the 
same group in the same role (A, B, or C) for 20 periods.4  
In the first stage of each period, subjects A and B decide simultaneously whether 
to cooperate (Option I) or defect (Option II) in a prisoner’s dilemma game (see Table 
1). The decision results in a payoff, in which the exchange rate is 40 tokens to 1 
euro. 
 
Table 1: Payoff table of the prisoner’s dilemma game 
 Person B 
  Option I Option II 
Option I 30           30 15            40 
Person A 
Option II 40           15 20            20 
 
In the second stage, upon observing each other’s choices, A and B simultaneously 
and independently select how many tokens to deduct from the other player. Every 
three tokens deducted from the other player costs a player one token. The deduction 
amount does not go to any player’s earnings. The maximum amount of tokens one 
could be punished is 40 within a period.   
In the baseline, C is merely an observer of the experiment. In the TPA treatment, C 
must decide simultaneously whether to veto the punishment decisions proposed by A 
and/or B, if any. Punishment proposals are implemented upon C’s approval.5 The 
punishment proposers do not incur any cost if the proposed punishment is not 
                                                        
4 We use a fixed matching scheme since we are interested in a repeated interaction environment such as firms or 
communities. 
5 In naturally occurring environments, institutions can empower the third party in various ways. For example, the 
third party can have the right to revise the punishment. As a first step, we adopt a binary decision mechanism to 
understand the impact of the third party’s intervention. We find the cooperation rate is lower under the third 
party’s intervention because the punishment is less severe. One may conjecture that the cooperation rate could be 
higher if the third party could revise the proposed punishment amount. In our experiment, we do not observe any 
evidence that the third party’s decisions vary on the proposed punishment amount. For example, punishment 
proposals on defectors lower than 6 tokens are approved in 57 out of 107 cases (53.3%) and those higher than 6 
tokens are approved in 118 out of 184 cases (64.1%). Probit regression analysis of the third party’s approval 
decisions indicates that the involved party’s proposed punishment amount (for either cooperators or defectors) 
does not play a significant role in the third party’s decisions. This implies that even allowing the third party to 
revise the proposal may not promote cooperation in our setting. Further studies are needed to understand how 
different ways of empowering the third party influence the outcome.    
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approved.  
In both treatments, all the decisions are revealed to each player at the end of each 
period. To keep the information symmetry between treatments, A and B still can see 
each other’s punishment proposals in the TPA treatment even if C bans any of them. 
C’s earnings in both treatments are independent of the outcome of the game. The 
program randomly draws a number from the prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix (15, 
20, 30, 40) with an equal probability, and this is common knowledge. Moreover, C 
learns his own earnings only at the end of the experiment, while A and B never know 
the actual earnings of C. This setting minimizes the possibilities that players’ 
decisions are affected by the comparison of earnings between the third party C and 
the players A and B. 
We conducted our experiment at the CentER lab at Tilburg University. We 
recruited 37 independent groups for the baseline treatment and 38 groups for the 
TPA treatment (225 subjects in total). The experiment was programmed and 
conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each period counted toward final earnings, 
resulting in average earnings of €12.90 per person for a 40-minute session. 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 plots the dynamics of the average group cooperation rates in both 
treatments. We find that the average cooperation rate is significantly lower in the 
TPA treatment than the baseline (0.47 vs. 0.70, Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05).6 
Furthermore, the average earnings are also marginally significantly lower in the TPA 
treatment (23.52 vs. 25.30, p < 0.10).  
 
Figure 1. Average cooperation rates over 20 periods by treatment 
 
 
To understand the observed treatment effect on cooperation, we test our 
hypotheses by comparing the punishment decisions across treatments. Given that 
                                                        
6 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. In all the analysis, we treat each 
group as an independent observation.  
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punishment severity is determined by both the frequency and the amount, we report 
the expected proposed and enforced punishment amount on the cooperators and 
defectors across treatments in Figure 2 (Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the 
punishment frequencies and average amounts across treatments). 
   We find supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1 that third parties reject antisocial 
punishment. As shown in Figure 2, in the TPA treatment, third parties significantly 
reduce the implementation of antisocial punishment proposals (1.90 vs. 0.91, p < 
0.05). The data also support Hypothesis 2 that third parties lower punishment on 
defectors (6.13 vs. 3.75, p < 0.1). Moreover, our data suggest an indirect effect of 
third parties’ interventions on the punishment proposals especially for the defectors, 
which may also contribute to the low cooperation level in the TPA treatment. 
Compared to the baseline, As and Bs propose much less punishment on defectors in 
the TPA treatment although the difference is not statistically significant (6.13 vs. 
14.94, p = 0.13). The proposed antisocial punishment remains very low in the TPA 
treatment as in the baseline, although it is marginally significantly higher than the 
baseline (1.90 vs. 1.07, p < 0.1).  
   Consistent with previous studies, our data suggest that antisocial punishment 
decreases cooperation while punishment imposed on defectors increases cooperation. 
In both treatments, cooperators, if not punished, continue cooperating in about 90% 
of the cases in the next period. In contrast, if punished, cooperators in both 
treatments continue cooperating in less than 50% of cases. Defectors, if not punished, 
cooperate in less than 10% of the cases in both treatments in the next period. But 
when defectors are punished, they switch to cooperation in 22.58% of the cases in 
the baseline and 35% of the cases in the TPA treatment. 
As we discussed above, our hypotheses indicate that the overall effect of the 
third party’s intervention may be determined by how often antisocial punishment 
occurs. In our experiment, antisocial punishment occurred only in a few cases. In 
particular, cooperators are punished in 17 out of 1036 cases (1.64%) whereas 
defectors are punished in 80 out of 444 cases (18.02%) in the baseline. In the TPA 
treatment, cooperators are proposed to be punished in 54 out of 716 cases (7.54%) 
whereas defectors are proposed to be punished in 291 out of 804 cases (36.19%).  
Thus a possible explanation why the third party’s intervention leads to a lower 
cooperation rate is that it largely decreases the positive impact of punishment on 
defectors in our setting.  
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Figure 2. Expected punishment amount by treatment 
 
Notes: For each group in each treatment, we calculate the product of the average punishment amount on 
cooperators (defectors) in a period and the frequencies of punishment decisions on cooperators (defectors). The 
expected punishment amount is the average of these products. Baseline-C represents antisocial punishment on 
cooperators in the baseline treatment; TPA-C represents antisocial punishment on cooperators in the TPA; 
Baseline-D means punishment on defectors in the baseline; TPA-D means punishment on defectors in the TPA. In 
the baseline, the proposed punishment is also the approved punishment.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Our study offers the first evidence that while third-party intervention controls 
antisocial punishment, it could lower cooperation in social dilemmas by diminishing 
punishment on defectors. As a first step, we exclude many features of the punishment 
mechanism with third-party approval in a naturally occurring environment. For 
example, we randomly assign a subject to be a third party in the experiment. In reality, 
the right to be the enforcer is either decided by law (such as judges) or selected by the 
governed people (such as tribe leaders). Moreover, a third party often benefits from 
good reputation and cooperation among the involved parties. Nevertheless, our 
findings draw attention to the importance of studying how these features influence 
effective punishment institutions when an independent third party is empowered with 
the right to uphold or negate punishment.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Punishment frequencies and average amount across treatments 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For each group in each treatment, we calculate how often a player’s 
partner proposes (a third party approves) punishment for him if he cooperates (defects). “Punishment frequency” 
is the average of these numbers. Similarly, for each group in each treatment, we calculate the average 
punishment amount a player’s partner proposes (or approves) if he cooperates (defects). “Average amount” is 
the average of these numbers.  
 
 Punishment toward cooperators Punishment toward defectors 
  
Baseline 
TPA 
(proposed 
punishment) 
TPA 
(approved 
punishment) 
 
Baseline 
TPA 
(proposed 
punishment) 
TPA 
(approved 
punishment) 
Punishment 
frequency 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.31 
(0.49) 
0.14  
(0.29) 
0.50 
(0.44) 
0.39 
(0.35) 
0.27 
(0.32) 
Average punishment 
amount 
4.36 
(10.03) 
2.73 
(4.00) 
1.72 
(3.98) 
19.74 
(15.70) 
10.00 
(9.56) 
7.50 
(8.41) 
Expected 
punishment 
1.07 
(3.65) 
1.90 
(3.02) 
0.91 
(2.18) 
14.94 
(15.51) 
6.13 
(9.85) 
3.75 
(7.74) 
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Experiment Instructions (TPA Treatment) 
Thank you for coming to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully! 
Talking is not allowed at any time during this experiment. If you have a question, 
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
This experiment consists of 20 periods. Each participant is in the role of either Person 
A, or Person B, or Person C. Each participant’s role will be randomly determined by 
the computer at the beginning of the experiment and remain the same during the 
experiment. The computer will also randomly group a Person A with a Person B and a 
Person C at the beginning of the experiment. Each participant will stay in the same 
group during the whole experiment (i.e. 20 periods).  
 
Each period consists of two stages as described below: 
 
Stage 1:  
Person A and Person B will simultaneously and individually decide whether to choose 
“Option I” or “Option II”. Each one’s earnings are determined as follows: (a) if both 
Person A and Person B select Option I, each earns 30 tokens; (b) if both Person A and 
Person B select Option II, each earns 20 tokens; and (c) if one selects Option I and the 
other one selects Option II, the one who chooses Option I earns 15 tokens and the one 
who chooses Option II earns 40 tokens. The payoff table below lists all the possible 
payoff outcomes for each possible scenario. The number on the left in each cell is 
Person A’s payoff and the number on the right is Person B’s payoff. 
 
                         Payoff Table 
  Person B 
  Option I Option II 
Option I 30           30 15            40 
Person A 
Option II 40           15 20            20 
 
Person C’s earnings in each period is determined by a random process. The computer 
will randomly assign 30, 15, 40 or 20, with equal chance, as Person C’s earnings in 
the first stage of each period. Person C will not know this randomly assigned payoff 
amount until the end of the experiment. Neither Person A nor Person B will ever 
know Person C’s randomly payoff throughout or after the experiment.  
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Stage 2 
At the beginning of the second stage, all participants of a group will be informed of 
the decisions and earnings of the Person A and the Person B of the group. Again, 
Person C’s earnings will not be revealed to anyone including Person C him/herself.  
 
First, Person A will have an opportunity to individually propose to the Person C in 
his/her group whether to deduct any amount of tokens from the matched Person B’s 
payoff. Every three tokens deducted from Person B’s payoff, if approved by Person C 
(see details below), will cost Person A one token. Meanwhile, Person B will also have 
the same opportunity to propose to Person C whether to deduct any amount of tokens 
from the matched Person A’s payoff. Similarly, every three tokens deducted from 
Person A’s payoff, if approved by Person C, will cost Person B one token.  
 
The maximum deduction amount a person can impose on the other is 40 tokens. That 
is, you can propose to deduct from the other person’s payoff by any amount of tokens 
between 0 and 40. However, the amount should be an integer number (e.g. 0, 1, 2…). 
 
Next, Person C will see both Person A’s and Person B’s decisions and payoffs in the 
first stage, and also Person A’s and Person B’s proposals in the second stage.  
 If either Person A or Person B proposed any deduction for the matched Person 
B or Person A, then Person C will have to decide whether to approve the 
proposal(s). If Person C decides to approve the proposed deduction amount, 
then the deduction will be implemented. In this case, the proposer’s earnings 
will also be deducted by one-third of the deduction amount as we noted above. 
Person C’s payoff will not change no matter what decision he/she makes. 
(Note: Person C does not know his/her randomly assigned payoff in the first 
stage when making this decision). 
 If neither Person A nor Person B proposed any deduction, then Person C does 
not have any decision to make. No change will be made for any one’s 
earnings.  
 
At the end of each period, each participant will see the decisions of each one in his/her 
group, the final earnings of Person A and B in that period. 
 
Each period will proceed in the same way. Each participant will play 20 periods with 
the same participants. Your final earnings are the sum of your earnings over 20 
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periods. After all the 20 periods finished, each participant will receive a cash payment 
in private. The exchange rate of tokens to Euro is:  
                       40 tokens = 1 Euro 
 
  
Examples 
Below are some examples to illustrate how payoffs in each period are determined.  
Suppose, in one period, in the first stage, Person A chose Option I and Person B 
chose Option II. Thus, Person A earns 15 tokens and Person B earns 40 tokens in the 
first stage. Suppose, in the second stage, Person A proposed to deduct 9 tokens from 
Person B’s earnings and Person B proposed to deduct 6 tokens from Person A’s 
earnings. Also, suppose the computer randomly assigns 30 tokens as Person C’s 
earnings in that period. 
 If Person C approved Person A’s proposal but rejected Person B’s proposal, each 
one’s earnings in this period are as follows: 
Person A’s earnings=15-3=12 
Person B’s earnings=40-9=31 
Person C’s earnings=30 
 If Person C approved both proposals in the above scenario, then each one’s 
earnings in this period are as follows: 
Person A’s earnings=15-3-6=6 
Person B’s earnings=40-2-9=29 
Person C’s earnings=30 
 If Person C rejected both proposals in the above scenario, then no one’s earnings 
would be changed. Each one’s earnings in this period are as follows: 
Person A’s earnings=15 
Person B’s earnings=40 
Person C’s earnings=30 
 
Now suppose in the second stage of that period, Person A proposed to deduct 8 
tokens from Person B’s earnings and Person B did not propose any deduction amount. 
In this case, Person C only needs to decide whether to approve Person A’s proposal.  
 If Person C approved it: 
Person A’s earnings=15-2.67=12.33 
Person B’s earnings=40-8=32 
Person C’s earnings=30 
 If Person C rejected it, then no one’s earnings would be changed: 
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Person A’s earnings=15 
Person B’s earnings=40 
Person C’s earnings=30 
 
Summary 
To repeat, each participant will play in the same group for 20 periods. Each period 
consists of two stages. In the first stage, each Person A and Person B will decide 
whether to choose Option I or Option II which will decide each one’s earnings in the 
first stage. Person C’s earnings in a period will be randomly determined by the 
computer (Person C will know this amount only at the end of the experiment after all 
the decisions have been made. Person A and Person B will not be informed about this 
amount throughout the experiment). In the second stage, after knowing Person A and 
Person B’s decisions in the first stage, Person A (Person B) will decide whether to 
propose any deduction amount to the paired Person B (Person A). The proposed 
deduction amount will implemented only if Person C approves it. Person C’s earnings 
will not change no matter whether s/he approves the proposal(s).  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment. 
 
The next several pages outline the procedure of the experiment and the 
computer screens when Person A, Person B, and Person C make their decisions.  
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In the first stage, Person A and Person B simultaneously decide which option to 
choose. Person C will be waiting.  
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In the second stage, Person A and Person B receive feedback regarding the outcome 
of the first stage. Then each proposes to the matched Person C whether to deduct any 
amount of tokens from the earnings for the matched Person A or Person B. 
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Next, Person C will see both Person A’s and Person B’s decisions and payoffs in the 
first stage, and also Person A’s and Person B’s proposals in the second stage. Then, 
Person C decides whether to approve or reject the proposal if any.  
Note: Once Person C clicks the “OK” button, s/he cannot change the decision. 
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At the end of each period, each participant (Person A, B, and C) will see the outcome 
of that period.  
 
 
 
